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Abstract—With the rapidly growing demand for the cloud ser-
vices, a need for efficient methods to trade computing resources
increases. Commonly used fixed-price model is not always the
best approach for trading cloud resources, because of its inflexible
and static nature. Dynamic trading systems, which make use of
market mechanisms, show promise for more efficient resource
allocation and pricing in the cloud. However, most of the existing
mechanisms ignore the seller’s costs of providing the resources. In
order to address it, we propose a single-sided market mechanism
for trading virtual machine instances in the cloud, where the
cloud provider can express the reservation prices for traded
cloud services. We investigate the theoretical properties of the
proposed mechanism and prove that it is truthful, i.e. the buyers
do not have an incentive to lie about their true valuation of
the resources. We perform extensive experiments in order to
investigate the impact of the reserve price on the market outcome.
Our experiments show that the proposed mechanism yields near-
optimal allocations and has a low execution time.
Index Terms—Cloud Computing, Truthful Market Mechanism
Design, Reservation Price, Greedy Resource Allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The market of cloud services is rapidly growing. The
number of enterprises and individuals, who outsource their
workloads to the cloud providers, is increasing [1][2]. In-
frastructure as a Service (IaaS), which is one of the cloud
provisioning models, allows an organization to outsource the
computational resources needed to support ”operation”. Most
commonly, IaaS is offered in the form of virtual machines
(VM), which are characterized by a number of components,
such as CPU, memory, storage, networks and other low level
resources. The provisioned resource is typically charged on-
demand or by subscription. Each traded VM type (i.e. instance
type) has its own price, which is pre-defined by the cloud
provider and does not change dynamically. Due to the inability
of the price to adapt to the demand, the resource is often traded
inefficiently [3][4]. The market-based mechanisms for trading
cloud resources start to be used by the cloud providers. An
example is Amazon EC2 Spot Market [5], which enables an
efficient provisioning of unutilized resource on EC2. While
Amazon EC2 Spot Market conducts separate auctions for
the VMs of different types (e.g. small, medium, large), we
argue that allowing more complex user requests (than a single
instance request) in a form of combinatorial bids is more
efficient [6] and more convenient for the users with complex
requirements.
A market mechanism for trading cloud services must satisfy
a number of requirements that are essential for the resource
consumers and a cloud provider (we consider a problem with
a single resource provider). The considered requirements and
the motivation are provided below:
• Reserve price: Cloud service provisioning incurs a certain
cost. Selling goods at the price below that cost results
in loss. This is the reason why the electronic markets
consider the minimum seller price. For example, eBay
has a reservation price [7]. The cloud providers typically
set minimum prices for their services. For example, a
reservation price is one of the constraints in Amazon EC2
Spot Market[5]. In our work we consider the reservation
price for the traded resources when designing the market
mechanism to enable the seller to gain a certain control
over the established market prices and to avoid non-
profitable trade.
• Fast market clearance: Cloud computing is a very dy-
namic environment with large amount of users. The
market mechanism for cloud resources has to have a low
computation complexity in order to be feasible in real
cloud market.
• Resource bundling: Very often, when outsourcing IT
infrastructure to the cloud, the buyers look for higher
reliability, or wish to balance the traffic load. In such
situation there is a need for a complex infrastructure,
which is composed of a number of different VMs, that
may be required, for example in different geographical re-
gions or availability zones [8]. Resource bundling allows
a more convenient way of accommodating such complex
requests. First of all, it allows the cloud consumers to ex-
press their complex infrastructure requirements in a single
request. Secondly, the budget constraint applies to a set of
resources and doesn’t have to be split across multiple re-
quests. In this work we consider a combinatorial setting in
order to address this issue. Combinatorial auctions, which
involve trading of bundles are proven to be more efficient
[9] and are successfully implemented for selling wireless
spectrum or in transportation procurement [10][11].
In addition we consider the following design desiderata:
• Allocative efficiency: An allocative efficient mechanism is
able to maximize the total utility (i.e. social welfare) of
the market participants (buyers), given a particular input.
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• Truthfulness: A truthful mechanism ensures that the
competition in the market is based on a single weakly
dominant strategy, which is to reveal the true valuation
for the requested resources. Truthful market mechanism
ensures fairness because the buyers are not disadvantaged
by telling the truth. Moreover, this market property sig-
nificantly simplifies the strategy space of the buyers. In
this work we design a truthful market mechanism, which
eliminates the buyer’s strategic behavior, making truth
telling a dominant buyer’s strategy.
Our contribution: We address the problem of VM pro-
visioning and allocation in the cloud. We design a combi-
natorial market mechanism for a single resource provider,
that allows the seller to express the minimum desirable price
for traded resources (i.e. reserve price). We investigate the
theoretical properties of the proposed market mechanism and
prove that it is truthful, i.e. the buyer’s dominant strategy is
to reveal her true valuation for the resources. We evaluate
the performance of the proposed mechanism in extensive
simulation experiments. The experimental results show that the
proposed allocation scheme achieves near optimal allocations
and has a low execution time. We study the impact of various
market conditions (e.g. resource over- or under-provisioning)
on the market outcomes (e.g. resource utilization, generated
revenue, etc.), and we define the regular rules for achieving
various objectives, such as maximizing the expected revenue
or resource utilization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we discuss the most relevant market-based approaches for
provisioning IaaS. In Section III, we describe the problem of
resource allocation in clouds. In Section IV, we describe our
mechanism and discuss its theoretical properties. Section V
is dedicated to the experimental evaluation of our proposed
mechanism. In Section VI we make several concluding re-
marks and discuss the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Market-based approach in IaaS is attracting more attention
in research community. We present the most closely related
works in this domain.
Lehmann et al. [12] discuss a truthful market mechanism
based on the greedy heuristics, which has become a fairly
popular approximation allocation mechanism for combinato-
rial domains. Zaman and Grosu [6] and Nejad et al. [13]
study combinatorial auction mechanisms for VM allocations
in the cloud with the unique resource provider. They propose
the greedy mechanisms, and a linear programming relaxation
and randomized rounding mechanism. They prove that the
greedy mechanisms are truthful and linear programming mech-
anism is truthful in expectation. Their work solves similar
problem to ours, but they assume that there is no resource
associated cost (and no resource reservation price), which is
hardly realistic. Sto¨ßer et al. [14] propose a knowledge-based
continuous double auction mechanism to determine the prices
of the future trades. They design an approximation mechanism
based on greedy heuristic and analyze the strategic behavior
in the market. Their proposed solution is not suitable for
combinatorial requests and does not guarantee truthfulness.
Lampe et al. [15] address a problem of concurrent pricing
and distribution of VMs across physical machines with the
objective of maximizing the seller’s revenue. They propose
an equilibrium price auction, where the demand is distributed
among multiple types of resources, each with its own equilib-
rium price. Their approximation mechanism (with reservation
price), while achieving near-optimal allocation, does not en-
sure truthfulness, which is a market property that we maintain
in our proposed mechanism.
Fujiwara [16] addresses a combinatorial problem of trading
cloud services in different timeslots. He designs an optimal
combinatorial mechanism using linear mixed integer program
for resource allocation and uses k-pricing scheme to deter-
mine the prices. The developed mechanism allows untruthful
bidding and tends to be computationally hard. Our proposed
approximation solution solves these two issues.
Xingwei et al. [17] consider a periodical combinatorial
auction with a single seller. They propose to determine the
resource prices based on limited English combinatorial auction
model, and to optimally allocate resources in different time-
frames based on genetic algorithm. Their proposed mechanism
does not guarantee truthfulness.
Zhao et al. [18] describe a marketplace for trading cloud
resources based on e-Bay-like transaction model that sup-
ports different services with different level of job priorities.
Their marketplace contains an auction system that encourages
truthful bidding. Unlike their work, we consider combinatorial
market setting with a unique seller without the requirement to
prioritize the requests.
Roovers [19] investigates a problem of double-sided allo-
cation in clouds. He shows that continuous double auction
is not feasible in the considered market setting and propose
continuous reverse auction to address the problem. Unlike that
work, we consider combinatorial setting and design a truthful
periodic market mechanism, because periodic mechanisms are
proved to generate more efficient allocations compared to
continuous market mechanisms.
All of the studies listed above propose the market mecha-
nisms for trading cloud resources, but none of them design a
truthful combinatorial market mechanism with the reservation
price. As was shown before, truthfulness, reservation price
and bundling are very important practical requirements for the
cloud market. One of the key differences of our work is that
we design a truthful combinatorial auction with reservation
price and investigate its performance, including the impact of
reservation price on the resource utilization, generated rev-
enue, offered discount, etc. To the best of our knowledge there
is no work presented in literature that investigates mechanism’s
truthfulness with reservation price.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We formulate a problem of cloud resource allocation. All
the notations are summarized in Table I.
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Seller: A cloud provider (i.e. seller) has a set of physical
resources (e.g. CPU, RAM, storage) that she wishes to sell to
the buyers (i.e. users, bidders) in the form of Virtual Machines
(VMs).
We assume that the cloud provider offers k different in-
stance types and each contains different amount of physical
components. For example, Amazon EC2 offers small, medium,
and large instances with their own pre-defined characteris-
tics in terms of CPU, RAM, and storage [20]. A seller
declares her reserve prices for the VMs, (i.e. offer prices),
which are characterized by vector: 〈o1, ..., ok〉. These are
the minimum prices that the seller wants for her resources
and she would not sell for the price below. The seller
specifies the amounts of supplied VMs of each type, which
are defined as 〈s1, ..., sk〉. The seller’s ask is expressed as
follows: a = (〈s1, ..., sk〉, 〈o1, ..., ok〉). For example, a =
(〈90, 50, 20〉, 〈$0.06, $0.12, $0.24〉) supplies 90, 50 and 20
VMs of three different types (e.g. small, medium and large)
and offers them at least for the specified reserve prices: $0.06,
$0.12 and $0.24 per item, respectively.
Buyers: We assume that n potential buyers (i.e. bidders)
participate in the auction U = {u1, ..., un}. All of the
bidders have various cloud service requirements and the budget
constraints. Thus, the bid is combinatorial and includes the
information about the set of required resources (bundle) dj =
〈r1j , ..., rkj〉, and the willingness to pay for the bundle (valua-
tion) vj ≥ 0. We assume that each buyer submits a single bid.
We consider a problem, where all bidders in the auction are
single-minded. A single-minded bidder has only two possible
states: either she obtains the entire requested bundle or any
superset of it (for the price within her valuation) or she values
the resource at 0 (her utility for partial request fulfillment is
0). A buyer’s bid is expressed as: bj = (〈r1j , ..., rkj〉, vj). For
example, bx = (〈2, 0, 1〉, $5) request two VMs of type 1 and
one VM of type 3 and the declared value for the bundle is $5.
Virtual Resource Allocation Problem: The goal of the virtual
resource allocation problem is, given a set of buyers U and
their bids bj , to determine the set of winners W ⊆ U and the
prices, pj , that they pay to the seller, such that:∑
j:uj∈W
rij ≤ si, i = 1, . . . , k (1)
oˆ(dj) ≤ pj ≤ vj , if uj ∈W (2)
pj = 0, if uj /∈W (3)
In the constraint (1) we ensure that the traded resource
capacity is not exceeded; referred to as Available Resource
Constraint (ARC). The constraint (2) confirms that the win-
ning user pays at most her declared valuation, and at least
the price that the seller wants for the requested bundle of
resource (dj). We define the bundle-specific reserve price as
oˆ(dj) =
∑k
i=1 rijoi, which is the weighted sum of reserve
prices for all the requested resources in the bundle. We refer to
vj ≥ oˆ(dj) as Reserve Price Constraint (RPC). The constraint
(3) implies that the losing bidders does not pay anything.
TABLE I: Notation
a The seller’s ask
k Number of VM types proposed by the seller
si Supplied amount of VMs of type i ≤ k
oi Reserve (offer) price for the VM of type i ≤ k
U Set of buyers (users) {u1, ..., un}
bj Bid of the buyer uj
rij The amount of VMs (resource) of type i ≤ k
requested by the user uj
dj The bundle of VMs requested (demanded) by uj
vj Declared valuation of the user uj
pj Price that the user uj pays
W Set of winning buyers W ⊆ U
The standard objective in combinatorial auction design is to
maximize the sum of the winning bidder’s valuations [21]. The
objective in our problem is to maximize V =
∑
j:uj∈W vj ,
subject to the constraints (1)-(3).
IV. MARKET MECHANISM
A. Mechanism Design Framework
The described allocation problem can be considered as a
multi-dimensional knapsack problem (MKP) with an addi-
tional constraints (2)-(3). However as MKP is NP-hard [22]
we propose a mechanism with approximate solution.
The goal is to design a truthful mechanism with the reserve
price constraint, that maximizes the social welfare V . Each
bidder in the market has her own true type, which is private
information. By type we denote a function, which determines
the bidder’s true valuation for the bundle of resources vˆj(dj).
Note that the true valuation for the bundle, determined by
function vˆj(dj), may be different from the declared value in
the bid vj .
Definition 1 (Truthfulness): A truthful mechanism makes
reporting a true user type a dominant strategy, i.e. the bidders
maximize their utility by truthful reporting regardless of the
other users’ reported bids. For a market mechanism to be
truthful, its allocation scheme must be monotone and the
pricing must be based on the critical value.
Definition 2 (Monotonicity): Monotonicity is a property,
which implies that the winning bid cannot lose by offering
more money for fewer goods, and the losing bid cannot win
by offering less money for more goods. Thus, if a bid b1 won,
changing the bundle d1 → d2, so that d2 ⊆ d11 or increasing
the reported valuation v1 → v2, so that v2 ≥ v1 would result
in the new bid being also allocated. The symmetrical situation
with the losing bid must also be true.
Definition 3 (Critical value pricing): When a mechanism
has a monotone allocation scheme, each bid would have a
unique value vcrj , called critical value, such that the reported
valuation above this value would result in the bid being granted
the requested resource (if vj ≥ vcrj ⇒ uj ∈ W ), but any
valuation below it would make the bidder lose (if vj < vcrj ⇒
1Given two bundles d1 = 〈r11, ..., rk1〉 and d2 = 〈r12, ..., rk2〉, we write
d1 ⊆ d2 if r11 ≤ r12& . . .&rk1 ≤ rk2.
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uj /∈ W ). A losing bid must pay nothing. The critical-value
pricing is determined as follows:
pj =
{
vcrj , if uj ∈W
0, otherwise
(4)
B. Truthful Greedy-RP Mechanism
We consider the Greedy heuristic [12] as the basis for our
mechanism which is called Greedy-RP. A greedy mechanism
consists of two steps: allocation and pricing. During the
allocation phase, the mechanism decides who are going to
be the winners and receive the resources. The pricing phase
determines the prices that the bidders have to pay.
Allocation Scheme: Greedy-RP allocation scheme is given
in Algorithm 1. The algorithm receives the seller’s offer, which
is a vector of resource capacities and reserve prices, and the
vector of bids. The output of the allocation scheme is a set of
determined winning users.
The idea of greedy allocation is to rank the bids based
on simple value (i.e. bid density). Generally, when allocating
homogeneous goods this value is a price per item. As we
consider combinatorial bids with the VMs of different types,
we need to know the relative relation (i.e. relativity) between
these resources in order to determine the bid density. The
relative relation is defined by vector 〈f1, . . . , fk〉, where
fi > 0 and f1 ≤ f2 ≤ . . . ≤ fk. As the reserve price is
often a reflection of resource cost, it could be a good measure
for the resource relative relation, because it takes into account
all the VM components (VM cost is a sum of individual VM
components costs). When we know the relativity between the
resources of different types, we can calculate the total weight
of the requested bundle as a weighted sum of the resources in
the bid dˆ(dj) (line 4) and re-order the users in non-increasing
order of their bid densities (line 5), which are defined as
follows:
dˆ(dj) =
k∑
i=1
rijfi (5)
e(bj) =
vj
|dˆ(dj)|q
, where q > 0 (6)
Please, note that the bid density form with the parameter q
was proposed by Lehmann [12], and changing the parameter
has an impact on the efficiency of resource allocation. We
design a market mechanism with the bid density that considers
q because changing this parameter according to the specific
market conditions can allow to flexibly improve the efficiency
of the allocation, as was investigated by Lehmann in a single-
item market mechanism setting. The experimental investiga-
tion of this impact in a multiple item auction is out of scope
of this work and will be investigated in future.
After sorting the users, the mechanism greedily allocates the
resources to them in the sorted order, subject to the ARC (1)
and RPC (2) (lines 6-10). If both constraints are satisfied, the
user becomes the winner (line 8) and she will receive exactly
the requested bundle (line 7); otherwise the bid is denied.
Algorithm 1 Greedy-RP Allocation Scheme (GRP-A)
1: Input: a = (〈s1, ..., sk〉, 〈o1, ..., ok〉); ask, which contains
a vector of resource capacities and reserve prices
2: Input: B = (b1, . . . , bn); vector of bids (bundle, value)
3: W ← ∅
4: Compute dˆ(dj) according to (5)
5: Re-order users such that: e(b1) ≥ e(b2) ≥ . . . ≥ e(bn) (6)
6: for j = 1, . . . , n do
7: if for all i = 1, . . . , k, rij +
∑
j′:uj′∈W rij′ ≤ si
and oˆ(dj) ≤ vj then
8: W ←W ∪ uj
9: end if
10: end for
11: Output: W
Lemma 1. The Greedy-RP Allocation Scheme is monotone.
Proof: To prove bid monotonicity we consider two bids:
b1 = (d1, v1) and b2 = (d2, v2), where v1 ≥ v2 and d1 ⊆ d2.
We will show that the winning bid cannot lose by offering
more money for fewer goods and the losing bid cannot win
by paying less for more goods.
If we calculate the bid densities based on presented form
e(b) = v|s|q , where q > 0. Since d1 ⊆ d2, then 0 ≤ |s1|≤ |s2|.
As q > 0, then |s1|q≤ |s2|q . Since v1 ≥ v2, we will get:
e(b1) ≥ e(b2). Thus, by changing (d1, v1) → (d2, v2), the
sorted list of bids may differ only in the bid b2 being moved
down in the sorted list. We call L1 the sorted list with the bid
b1, and L2 the list with the bid b2. If b1 was denied in L1
there are two possible reasons for this:
• ARC: there is another bid bc which is ordered before the
bid b1 and there was not enough resource for b1. Then,
bc would also be ordered before bid b2 in the list L2
(because e(b1) ≥ e(b2)) and, as d1 ⊆ d2, the bid b2
would be denied as well.
• RPC: if the bid b1 was denied because of violat-
ing the RPC, it means that v1 < oˆ(dj), where
oˆ(dj) =
∑k
i=1 rijoi. Since d1 ⊆ d2, we get r11 ≤
r12& . . .&rk1 ≤ rk2. Thus
∑k
i=1 ri1oi ≤
∑k
i=1 ri2oi,
which is oˆ(d1) ≤ oˆ(d2). Since v2 ≤ v1 < oˆ(d1) ≤ oˆ(d2),
we get v2 < oˆ(d2). It means that the bid b2 would not
satisfy the RPC neither.
Similarly, the opposite is true: if the bid b2 was granted in the
list L2, the bid b1 will be granted in the list L1. Hence, the
proposed allocation scheme is monotone.
Pricing Scheme: The pricing scheme receives the seller’s
offer, vector of bids and the set of winning bidders as its input.
It aims to determine the prices that the market participants have
to pay. The payment vector P is the outcome of the pricing
scheme. We aim to define a general pricing mechanism for any
bid density of the specified form, which would determine the
critical-value payments for the winning bids in W . Critical-
value price is the minimum possible price that the winner
could have proposed for the bundle in order to win the auction.
The payment scheme determines the payments for the
winning bids in order (line 4). In greedy market mechanisms
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Algorithm 2 Greedy-RP Pricing Scheme (GRP-P)
1: Input: a = (〈s1, ..., sk〉, 〈o1, ..., ok〉); ask, which contains
a vector of resource capacities and reserve prices
2: Input: B = (b1, . . . , bn); vector of bids (bundle, value)
3: Input: W ; winning users
4: for all uj ∈W do
5: B′ ← B \ {bj}
6: W ′ ← GRP-A(a, B’)
7: W ′j ←W ′ \W
8: if W ′j 6= ∅ then
9: ecompj ← maxbh:uh∈W ′j (e(bh))
10: else
11: ecompj ← 0
12: end if
13: ecrj ← max(ecompj , eres(bj))
14: pj ← (ecrj )|dˆ(dj)|q
15: end for
16: for all uj /∈W do
17: pj ← ∅
18: end for
19: Output: P = (p1, . . . , pn); the payment vector
the bid density is used to determine the final prices that the
bidders pay. In our mechanism the final determined price that
the winner pays is either based on the density of the first
losing competitor bid ecompj (also referred to as competitor
bid density), or on the bid-specific reserve density eres(bj).
First of all, the mechanism finds the first losing competitor
bid. The first losing competitor bid for the bid bj is the bid
that lost, but would have been granted if bj did not participate
in the market. In order to find it, the mechanism constructs a
new market setting, which excludes the current bid and runs
the allocation scheme with the new setting (lines 5-6). After
that, the mechanism selects only the new winners compared
to the initial allocation (line 7) and determines the one with
the highest bid density, which would be the first losing bid
(lines 8-12). Such a bid may not exist and even if it exists,
its density may be lower than the required density needed
for the calculated price to satisfy the reserve price constraint
(Const. 2). It happens because of the non-linear nature of the
bid density function, when the parameter q 6= 1. In order to
address that, we introduce the bid-specific reserve density:
eres(bj) =
oˆ(dj)
|dˆ(dj)|q
It is the minimum possible density, which when applied to
the bundle dj would generate the price that would satisfy the
constraint RPC.
We determine the critical density ecrj of the bid bj by
selecting the highest density value between the first losing
competitor bid and the reserve bid density (line13). We de-
termine the final price of the bid bj based on the critical bid
density ecrj , if the user was the winner (line 14), and the final
price is set to 0 for the losing users (line 16-18).
Lemma 2. The Greedy-RP Pricing determines critical-value
payment.
Proof: Critical-value price is the lowest possible price
that a winning bidder could have proposed for the requested
bundle in order to still be the winner. In our mechanism the
price pj a winning bidder uj has to pay is based on the critical
density, which may either be the first losing bid density ecompj
or the bid-specific reserve density eres(bj). Thus, there are
two possible cases:
• pj is based on e
comp
j : This density is the lowest possible
density for the bid to be competitive enough to win the
auction, if it satisfies the constraint RPC. Any bid with a
density less than ecompj would result in another competitor
bid being granted instead. Hence the price pj generated
based on ecompj is the critical-value.
• pj is based on eres(bj): When there are no losing bids
to a bid bj or when the bid density of the highest losing
bid does not meet the reserve density ecompj < eres(bj),
the reserve bid density is used to calculate the price pj .
Any bid with a density less than eres(bj) would result in
the bid being refused by the constraint RPC. Thus, this
density generates the critical-value price.
We can see that our proposed pricing scheme determines a
critical value price for the winners and does not charge the
lost bidders (lines 16-18), which corresponds to the critical
value pricing definition (Eq. 4).
Theorem 1. The Greedy-RP Mechanism is truthful for single-
minded bidders.
Proof: We prove that the proposed mechanism contains
four properties introduced by Lehmann et al. [12] that are
shown to be sufficient for the mechanism to be truthful.
Exactness: Given an order of the bidders according to
their (non-increasing) bid densities, our allocation scheme
satisfies exactness because the bidders either receive the exact
requested bundle or don’t receive anything.
Participation: This property requires that a losing bidder
pays nothing. In our mechanism, a bid bj is either granted or
denied, and denied bidder pays nothing.
Monotonicity and Critical-value: See Lemma 1 and 2.
As our proposed mechanism maintains all four properties,
it is proved to be truthful for single-minded bidders.
Computational complexity: The allocation scheme in the
proposed mechanism runs in polynomial time in the size
of its input. The major computation is in order to sort the
list of users. The sorting phase runs in O(|N |log|N |) time.
The constraints verification and the actual resource allocation
computes in O(N). The pricing scheme runs as maximum N
times and invokes winner determination each time, thus its
computation complexity is O(|N2|log|N |).
Budget-balance: In our proposed mechanism the payments
made by the buyers are the payments to the seller, which
makes our mechanism weakly budget balanced.
Individual Rationality: The constraints (2) and (3), consid-
ered in our proposed mechanism, ensure individual rationality.
5
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TABLE II: Greedy-RP Example: Bids
bj dj vj dˆ(dj) Density Res.
VM1 VM2 q=1 q= 12 Price
b1 1 0 $10 1 10.0 10.0 $8 3
b2 0 1 $19 2 9.5 13.4 $16 3
b3 2 2 $59 6 9.8 24.1 $48 3
b4 3 1 $51 5 10.2 22.8 $40 3
b5 1 1 $23 3 7.7 13.3 $24 7
TABLE III: Greedy-RP Example:Allocation Phase
Step Allocation Results
q = 1 q = 12
1 Sorted order b4, b1, b3, b2, b5 b3, b4, b2, b5, b1
2 RPC b4, b1, b3, b2 b3, b4, b2, b1
3 ARC b4, b1, b2 b3, b2
TABLE IV: Greedy-RP Example: Pricing Phase
bj e
comp
j eres(bj) e
cr
j pj
q = 1
b4 e(b3) = 9.8 8.0 9.8 9.8 ∗ 5 = $49
b1 no Bid 8.0 8.0 8.0 ∗ 1 = $8
b2 no Bid 8.0 8.0 8.0 ∗ 2 = $16
q = 12
b3 e(b1) = 10.0 19.6 19.6 19.6 ∗ 6 12 = $48
b2 e(b1) = 10.0 11.3 11.3 11.3 ∗ 2 12 = $16
C. Mechanism example
In order to illustrate the way the mechanism works, we
consider a simple example. We have five bids participating
in the auction as depicted in the Table II, and the Ask a =
(〈4, 4〉, 〈$8.0, $16.0〉). We assume that the relative relationship
between the resources is based on the ratio between resource
reserve prices. As VM2 is twice more expensive, we assume
that its relativity is 〈1, 2〉. In our example, we consider two
different bid densities, when q = 1 - linear density, and when
q = 12 - square root density.
We can see that, based on the selected bid density type, the
mechanism favors different types of bids (Table III): we obtain
different bid orders in two considered cases. In general, when
q is low, the bid that requests more resource is favored, which
may have a positive impact on the utilization. The sorted bids
order is not critical when verifying the RPC. All the bids with
the valuation below the required minimum are denied. The
ARC considers the bids in the sorted order, and the outcomes
may be different with different bid density forms. As a result
of allocation scheme, the winners are determined - 3 winners
when q = 1 : (b4, b1, b2), and 2 winners when q = 12 : (b3, b2).
During the pricing phase (Table IV), the bid-specific reserve
density serves as a verifier for the reserve price constraint.
When the bid density form is linear and there is no first losing
bid (competitor bid), the bid-specific reserve density sets the
TABLE V: True valuation bids solved
Bid dj vj e(bj) W e
comp
j oˆ(dj) pj
b1 〈1, 2, 1〉 $7.2 2 Yes 5.4 3.6 5.4
b2 〈0, 1, 3〉 $14 2.5 Yes 8.4 5.6 8.4
b3 〈1, 0, 1〉 $3 1.5 No - 2.0 -
TABLE VI: Untruthful bidding scenarios (for bid b2)
N d2′ v2′ Scenario W p2′ Util.
1 〈0,1,3〉 14 v2′=v2, d2′=d2 Yes 8.4 5.6
2 〈0,1,3〉 18 v2′ > v2, d2′=d2 Yes 8.4 5.6
3 〈0,1,3〉 10 v2′ < v2, d2′=d2 Yes 8.4 5.6
4 〈0,1,3〉 6 v2′  v2, d2′=d2 No 0.0 0.0
5 〈1,1,3〉 14 v2′=v2, d2′ ⊃ d2 Yes 9.0 5.0
6 〈0,1,6〉 14 v2′=v2, d2′ ⊃ d2 No 0.0 0.0
final price for the bid to the value of reserve price for the
bundle. When the bid density form is not linear (0 < q < 1),
the price generated by the density of the first losing bid is often
below the reserve price for the bundle. The bid-specific reserve
density ensures that the RPC is not violated. For example, if
the density of the competitor bid b1 was used to determine the
final price for the bid b3 (q = 12 ), it would be 10∗61/2 = $24.5,
which is almost half of the initial reserve price of $48.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we investigate experimentally the proposed
mechanism’s behavior with various market settings, involving
resource under-provisioning (UP) when supply < demand,
resource over-provisioning (OP) when supply > demand, and
resource exact-provisioning (EP) when supply = demand.
First, we demonstrate truthfulness of the proposed mech-
anism. After that, we conduct two experiments. The aim of
the first experiment is to investigate the proposed mechanism’s
behavior. In the second experiment, we examine the allocation
performance of the proposed mechanism in comparison with
other allocation schemes for MKP.
A. Greedy-RP Truthfulness example:
We experimentally investigate truthfulness of our proposed
Greedy-RP mechanism. In order to analyze the impact of
untruthful bidding and to show that our mechanism is robust
against the strategic manipulation by the buyers, we consider
the example of three truly declared bids: b1 = (〈1, 2, 1〉, $7.2),
b2 = (〈0, 1, 3〉, $14), b3 = (〈1, 0, 1〉, $3). The seller’s ask
supplies four resource units of each type with the reserve
prices as follows: a = (〈4, 4, 4〉, 〈$0.4, $0.8, $1.6〉). We as-
sume that the relative relation between the instance types is
based on the reserve prices. We also select linear bid density
form (q = 1) for simplicity. The Greedy-RP determines the
solution as depicted in the Table V. The bids b1 and b2 are
allocated the resource and the determined prices are $5.4 and
$8.4 respectively.
We suppose that the user with the bid b2 lies and declares
different untruthful types (lies about her valuation and bundle).
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The market outcome depends on the declared values of d2′ and
v2′ . We consider six different scenarios, which are depicted in
the Table VI. We determine the user’s utility as the difference
between the true type valuation ($14) and the final determined
price (pj). In case 1, the buyer states her true bundle and
valuation. In case 2, the buyer increases the valuation of the
bid, but the determined price and the utility remains the same
as in the true declaration because the price is a critical-value.
In case 3, the valuation of the bid b2 is reduced, but it is still
above the critical value price ($10.0 > $8.4), which allows the
bid to win. The buyer’s utility is the same as when the true type
was specified because the determined price is also the same. In
case 4, the declared valuation is below the critical value price
($6.0 < $8.4), which is the reason for the bid to be denied
and utility drop to 0. In case 5, the bid requests bigger bundle
than in the true declaration. The bid is allocated, however the
critical-value price increases, which has a negative impact on
the buyer’s utility. In case 6, the requested bundle is too large
for the bid to be allocated, which results in 0 utility. We can
see that in all the cases, the user cannot increase her utility by
untruthful bidding, which confirms mechanism’s truthfulness.
B. Experiment 1 (Greedy-RP Analysis):
In this experiment, we examine our proposed mechanism
(Greedy-RP). The aim of this experiment is to investigate how
various market inputs influence the cloud resource utilization,
social welfare (i.e. total offered discount), generated revenue
and the total resource cost.
Experimental Setup: Our experimental setup is depicted in
the Table VII. In this work we consider linear bid density with
q = 1. The experimental investigation of various bid densities
and its impact on the resource allocation is out of scope of
this work and will be investigated in the future.
We assume that there are 50 buyers participating in the
market, which is not large enough to result in extremely long
computation time and is not too small to affect our experimen-
tal precision. The number of bidders doesn’t have an impact on
the market outcome in our experiments because we experiment
with different supply values. Inspired by a real-world example,
where the cloud providers estimate their possible gain or
loss from resource over-provisioning or under-provisioning,
we first establish the demand and generate different levels of
supply (as a percentage of demand) in order to examine its
impact.
As there is no publicly available information about the cloud
buyers’ requests, we achieve the variability in the market input
by randomly generating the requested bundles of resources and
valuations based on normal distribution functions (DF). We
construct the distribution functions in the way that 99.73% of
the randomly generated values lie in the specific range. We
regenerate all the values that are out of the required range
(0.27%). When generating the resource bundle, we apply the
same DF for each resource type (RT), which are distributed
over the range [0, 5]. The valuation of the bid is generated as
a random value (v¯j) for the smallest unit of resource (o1) and
TABLE VII: Experimental Setup
Parameter Values
Demand side of the market (Buyers)
Number of bids 50
Resource rij ∼ N (2.5, 0.833) : rij ∈ [0, 5]
Valuation v¯j ∼ N (0.5, 0.166) : v¯j ∈ [0, 1]
Supply side of the market (Seller)
Resource Types k = 1, 2, 3
Supply 50, 75, 100, 125, 150% of rij
RP oi = [0.0, 0.1, ..., 0.9] ×fi
is scaled according to the weighted amount of resource in the
bundle (dˆ(dj)).
We experiment with three different numbers of offered
resource types (k). In order to define the relative relation
between the VMs of different types we consider the prices of
small, medium and large instances from Amazon EC2 [20],
which scale based on such ratio 1:2:4 (rounded values). We
construct five provisioning levels based on the demand for
each resource type (5k cases) in order to investigate the impact
of different supply-demand conditions on the market outcome.
We vary the reservation prices (oi) within the valuation’s range
v¯j ∈ [0, 1] (scaled according to fi) in order to examine the
impact of varying reserve price on the market outcome. It
should also be noted that when RP = 0.0, our mechanism
performs as CA-Greedy[6], which allows us to compare those
two different mechanisms in different settings.
Overall, we construct 1550 different market settings. We
repeat each setting 1000 times and calculate the average values
for the resource utilisation, generated social welfare (i.e. total
buyers’ utility), revenue, amount of sold and not sold resource.
Because of the limited space we discuss only representative
results. We discuss the case, when 2 resource types are offered
in the market. The results are summarized in the Fig. 1.
Supply, Demand and Resource Utilization: The Figs. 1a-
1d show how the average resource utilization changes with
different resource provisioning levels. We can see that the
utilization of resources of different type is highly interrelated.
An inaccurate cloud provider’s estimate for resource supply
of one type has a negative impact on the average resource
utilization. For example, when the RT1 is supplied in exact
quantity (100%) and the RT2 is under-provisioned (75%) (Fig.
1a), the RT2 is fully utilized because of insufficient supply. As
the resources in combinatorial bids are complementary, the
RT2 becomes a bottleneck and prevents the mechanism from
selling the entire capacity of the RT1. Thus, in combinatorial
auctions, if at least one type of resource is UP, the entire
market becomes UP. We can see that the average utilization is
maximized when both resource types are provisioned in equal
proportion (e.g. 50%-50%, 75%-75%) (Figs. 1a, 1b).
Across the Figs. 1a - 1d, we can see that with increasing
RP the average resource utilization decreases. When the RP
is high, more bids violate the RPC, which results in reduced
resource utilization. However the less resource is provisioned
(in equal proportion), the higher the competition between the
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(a) Avg. Res. Utilization: RP=0.1 (b) Avg. Res. Utilization: RP=0.2 (c) Avg. Res. Utilization: RP=0.3 (d) Avg. Res. Utilization: RP=0.4
(e) Revenue: High UP (Supply from 50%) (f) Revenue: Low UP (Supply from 75%) (g) Revenue: OP (Supply >= 100%)
(h) Buyer’s Utility (Social Welfare): High UP (Sup-
ply from 50%)
(i) Buyer’s Utility (Social Welfare): Low UP (Supply
from 75%)
(j) Buyer’s Utility (Social Welfare): OP (Supply >=
100%)
(k) Cost: Supply RT1 = RT2 = 50%, ςrun =
25% of v¯mean
(l) Cost: Supply RT1 = RT2 = 100%, ςrun =
25% of v¯mean
(m) Cost: Supply RT1 = RT2 = 150%, ςrun =
25% of v¯mean
(n) Seller’s utility: Supply RT1 = RT2 = 50%,
ςrun = 25% of v¯mean
(o) Seller’s utility: Supply RT1 = RT2 = 100%,
ςrun = 25% of v¯mean
(p) Seller’s utility: Supply RT1 = RT2 = 150%,
ςrun = 25% of v¯mean
Fig. 1: Experiment 2: Greedy-RP Study (k = 2, rij ∈ [0, 5])
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buyers, and when the RP increases, the resource utilization is
higher (Figs. 1c, 1d). In other words, when there is not enough
resource available, the seller can increase the RPs with the
lower negative impact on the resource utilization.
Revenue and Utilization: The total revenue depends on the
market state (OP or UP), resource utilization and the RP . We
depict the revenue fluctuation for two UP cases (high UP -
Fig. 1e and low UP Fig. 1f), and the OP case (Fig. 1g). The
revenue depends on the amount of sold resource. This amount
is bounded either by the market demand in OP case (we cannot
sell more than what was requested), or by the least supplied
resource in UP case (resource complementarity). In high UP
case, compared to low UP case, there is less resource supplied
to the market; hence less revenue is generated.
In UP case the revenue generated when RP = 0 is based on
the competition between the buyers. We can see that the seller
does not experience significant improvement in her revenue by
increasing the RP in UP case. In OP case due to the absence
of the competition between the buyers, the RP becomes the
price that the bidders pay. As we saw before, higher RP results
in reduced resource utilization, which in turn has a negative
impact on the revenue (Fig. 1g). We can see that the RP is
essential for the seller in order to improve the revenue when
resource is OP (OP is common for cloud environment).
Revenue and Buyers’ Utility: While increasing the RP
can have positive and negative impact on the seller’s revenue,
the buyers’ utility (social welfare), which is a total offered
discount can only degrade. When the RP is significantly high,
buyers’ utility drops because of more bids being denied. In
fact, the buyers’ generated discount and the seller’s revenue are
directly linked: higher seller’s revenues are based on reduced
discounts for the buyers (Figs. 1e-1j). The reservation price
allows to establish a trade-off between the generated revenue
and the total buyers’ utility (unlike when RP = 0.0 [6])
Resource Cost: Any cloud service has a certain incurred
cost. In cloud and grid environments it is common to differ the
cost of idle resource (ςidle) and the cost of the resource which
is utilised (i.e. running resource, ςrun), that tends to be higher
because of e.g. increased power consumption [15]. We calcu-
late the total resource cost, as a sum of costs of running and
idle resources. We assume that ςrun = 25% from v¯mean($0.5)
and we vary ςidle as 25, 50, 75, 100% of ςrun (changing ςrun
will only scale the result). Because of the limited space we
depict the graphs for total resource costs when resources of
both types are equally UP, EP, and OP (Figs. 1k - 1m).
We can see how the total resource cost fluctuates depending
on the RP , ςrun and ςidle. With increasing RP , the resource
utilization drops and more resource becomes idle. As a result,
the total cost slopes down as the idle resource is cheaper. The
bigger the difference between ςrun and ςidle, the faster the
total cost drops. At the Fig. 1k (resource is UP) the total cost
remains at the same level for the RP from 0.0$ to 0.3$ because
the utilization is maximized at this interval. At the Fig. 1m
(resource is OP), the resource associated cost is different even
when the resource utilization is maximized, because supply >
demand (there is always some idle resource).
Seller’s Utility: We determine seller’s utility as the dif-
ference between the generated revenue and the total resource
associated cost. While the seller’s utility mainly depends on
the costs of idle and running resource, we depict the example
considered for the resource cost (Figs. 1n-1p).
We can see that, in all three cases, there is a certain point
when seller’s utility start to drop. When the resource is UP
(Fig. 1n), the seller’s utility remains the same, while the
resource utilization is maximized. In case of EP and OP, the
seller’s utility increases while the revenue increases (Fig. 1g).
Depending on the values of ςrun and ςidle, there may be a
different strategy for selecting the RP in order to maximize
the seller’s utility. For example, if ςidle is very low compared
to ςrun, it may be more interesting to set the RP higher and to
sell small amount of resource but at a higher price; the incurred
total cost will be small since the idle resource is cheap.
The reservation price allows to establish a trade-off between
the seller’s and total buyers’ utilities. For example, in the case
of exact resource provisioning, the RP = 0.3 results in the
total buyers’ utility of around $25 (Fig. 1g) and the seller’s
utility fluctuates between $0 and $50 depending on the value
of ςidle (Fig. 1o). In contrast, if there is no RP (or RP =
0.0), the seller’s utility would always be negative which is not
acceptable for the seller.
C. Experiment 2 (Allocation Schemes):
In this experiment, we compare three different allocation
schemes: the exact optimization mechanism for the Multi-
dimensional Knapsack Problem (MKP) [22] (the recursive
formula for dynamic programming implementation was taken
from [23]), a modified MKP mechanism with the added
RPC (MKP-RP), and a greedy allocation scheme from our
proposed mechanism (Greedy-RP). The experimental setting
is the same as used in Experiment 1 - Table VII. We measure
the computation time and the social welfare (
∑
j:uj∈W vj),
which is a measure of allocative efficiency.
We discuss representative result, when there were two of-
fered resource types (k = 2). At the Figure 2b, we demonstrate
the closeness of the social welfare, obtained by our proposed
mechanism, to the optimal social welfare (MKP). It can
be observed that when the RP is increasing, our proposed
mechanism produces less efficient results. We noticed that the
social welfare is directly linked with the resource utilization:
when the utilization is maximized, more bidders obtain the
resource; thus, the social welfare is higher. As the MKP does
not consider the RPC, the social welfare remains the same
(maximized). We can see that when the resource is UP, the
optimal allocations are achieved with higher reserve prices,
because the resource utilization is close to maximum (Fig.
1c, case of 50-50%). If we compare the social welfare of our
mechanism with MKP-RP, all the allocations would be close
to optimal (≈ 100%).
In terms of computation time, the fastest and the most
scalable is the greedy allocation scheme (Fig. 2a). This result
confirms a number of other experiments conducted by other
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(a) Computation Time (b) Social Welfare: closeness of opt. (Greedy-RP to MKP)
Fig. 2: Experiment 2: Allocation Scheme
authors [6][14]. The MKP-RP computes a little faster com-
pared to the MKP because of the smaller mechanism input
(bids that passed RPC only).
VI. CONCLUSION
We have designed a truthful market mechanism with the
reserve price constraint for trading cloud resources (based
on Greedy heuristic). We have investigated the theoretical
properties of the mechanism and proved that it is truthful. We
have conducted extensive experiments in order to investigate
how the amount of supplied and requested resource, and
reservation prices influence the cloud resource utilization,
generated revenue, resource associated cost, and buyer’s utility.
Our experiments reveal that using our mechanism in order
to maximize the resource utilization, the cloud provider has
to provision each resource type in equal proportion to the
demand. An inaccurate estimate for the supply of resource of
one type has a negative impact on overall resource utilization
because of resource complementarity in combinatorial re-
quests. When the resource in the market is under-provisioned,
the reserve price, typically, does not achieve significant im-
provement in the cloud provider’s revenue, because the prices
are determined based on the competition between the buyers.
However, reserve price is essential when the resource is over-
provisioned because in such market state a reserve price
becomes price-deterministic. Our experiments show that the
reserve price is useful and provides a mechanism to achieve
the trade-off between the seller’s and the total buyers’ utilities.
The experiments also show that the allocation scheme in the
proposed mechanism yields near optimal allocations and has a
low execution time. In our experiments we have considered the
linear bid density. In the future work the impact of various bid
densities on the proposed market mechanism’s performance
will be taken into consideration.
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